Over the last decade, six EU member states have introduced pre-departure integration requirements for family migrants. The Netherlands was the first to introduce such 'civic integration abroad' policies. Its example has been followed by Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, and the UK. While it is well established in the literature that the European Union has played a crucial role in the proliferation of these and similar mandatory integration policies, the question why and how these policies have spread through Europe has not been subjected to analytical scrutiny. This paper shows that while the EU has functioned as a platform for the exchange of ideas, EU institutions such as the Commission have strived to obstruct this process. The only actors promoting the transfer of pre-departure integration measures were national governments. For these governments, representing such measures as a 'common practice' among member states was a strategy to build legitimacy for restrictive reform.
Introduction
In March 2005, the Dutch Parliament adopted a policy that was radically innovative: henceforth, foreigners who wanted to come to the Netherlands to live with a family member would have to demonstrate a basic level of knowledge of Dutch language and society, before being admitted to the country. In the next six years, five European countries followed the Dutch example: Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, and the UK now require family migrants to take the first steps in learning about their new country´s language and -in France and Denmark -customs abroad, before leaving their country of origin.
1 This paper examines the role of the European Union in this proliferation of pre-departure integration requirements for family migrants among EU member states.
Since the late 1990s, more and more European countries have introduced civic integration programs, which enable or require migrants to acquire language skills and country Directive, in which the notion of submitting entry and residence to integration requirements has been inscribed (Joppke 2007; Carrera and Wiesbrock 2009; Carrera 2006; Guild et al 2009; Böcker and Strik 2011) . Groenendijk (2004) emphasises that this approach to integration as a condition for residence rights was introduced to the European agenda by a select group of member states, most notably the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria. As a result of their successful efforts, 'the common EU policy is now a vehicle for legitimising and promoting (…) policies and programmes, which use integration in a civic and conditional fashion' (Carrera and Wiesbrock 2009: 36) .
However, the question of how and why these policies have proliferated so fast in Europe has not been satisfactorily answered, mostly because the process of transfer itself has not been subject of analysis until now. As a result, much less is known about to which extent and how national policymaking processes in the field of civic integration have been influenced by EU and other member states' policies. This is especially true for the transfer of pre-departure integration conditions. Goodman (2011) , in an article in which she argues convincingly that pre-departure integration measures aim at migration restriction, rather than at migrant integration, does touch upon the issue of transfer indirectly. She states that the Family Reunification Directive has set 'a supranational precedent that created the political opportunity for national implementation' and 'created a legitimacy that makes it possible for member states to link integration requirements to immigration' (Goodman 2011: 235, 242) . Besides this supranational source, Goodman points to learning among member states, with Dutch predeparture integration policies serving as a 'model' that has 'inspired' other member states (Goodman 2011: 250-252) . In this article, I will argue that Goodman is right in describing 'horizontal' mimicking processes among member states as crucial to the proliferation of pre-departure integration measures, but that she over-estimates the 'vertical' role of supranational sources such as the Family Reunification Directive.
I will show that the European Union has played a much more ambiguous role. As a result of the introduction of European migration policies, the EU has indeed come to function as a platform for exchange and promotion of policy ideas among member states, including the idea of pre-departure integration measures. However, supranational law and supranational institutions only played a minor part in facilitating this transfer. Different categories of actors operating at EU level have influenced the process of transfer in opposite ways (cf. Block & Bonjour 2013) . The legitimacy of the Family Reunification Directive as a legal basis for predeparture integration measures was controversial and weak from the very start. EU institutions, most notably the Commission, have strived to obstruct rather than promote the diffusion of pre-departure integration policies. Instead, member states were the main actors of transfer.
The following section sets the scene by providing a brief comparative description of pre-departure integration requirements in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. In the third section, I explore the role of the EU in the transfer of these requirements, arguing that the EU served as a platform for horizontal diffusion among member states. Pre-departure integration requirements for the admission of family migrants are a recent invention. Previously, language requirements have been used in migrant selection procedures where language skills were directly relevant to the grounds for admission, i.e. in the selection of labour migrants or of ethnic migrants (Groenendijk, 2011) . For example, as of 1997
Germany required so-called Aussiedler to prove their belonging to the German nation by demonstrating German language skills (Block 2012) . The innovation of the new pre-departure integration requirements lies in that now, language requirements are applied to migrants whose claim to admission is grounded in the moral value of family life -a claim on which their language skills have no bearing. The first time the admission of family migrants was submitted to integration conditions was in the 1990s in Germany, where foreign children between 16 and 18 years old were required to prove either proficiency in German or ability to integrate before being allowed to join their parents (Seveker and Walter 2010) . Also in Germany, in 2005, family members of Aussiedler were required to demonstrate a basic level of German language skills before being granted access to German territory and citizenship (Block 2012 It is probably no coincidence that these six countries are at the forefront of the policy were a great deal more controversial in France than elsewhere may go a long way towards explaining why the French policy on this issue is by far the least restrictive (Bonjour 2010 Groenendijk (2011: 8) , 'the Netherlands was instrumental in extending the fund's scope' to these measures.
Thus, the EU has served as a platform for exchange of information about pre-departure integration requirements, as well as for the promotion of such requirements, without however imposing obligations upon member states. In this respect, the proliferation of pre-departure integration requirements is similar to what is usually called 'horizontal Europeanization' in the literature, i.e. 'the diffusion of ideas and discourses about the notion of good policy and best practice' through EU policy and politics, 'where there is no pressure to conform to EU models' (Radaelli 2003: 30, 41) . However, the transfer of pre-departure integration contrasts with 'horizontal Europeanisation', in that it was operated exclusively by member states, without support from the Commission and Court. Radaelli (2000: 26) Germany persists, the Commission may eventually ask the EU Court to rule directly on the admissibility of pre-departure integration requirements.
Thus, the EU served as a platform for the diffusion and promotion of policy concepts, thereby providing the opportunity for the transfer of pre-departure integration requirements.
However, unlike the common representation of horizontal Europeanisation in the literature, this process occurred against the express opposition of the Commission, rather than with its support. Member states have been the only agents of transfer.
Legitimacy in shared practice: references to transfer in political debates
In sum of the argument in the previous section, the transfer of pre-departure integration requirements among EU member states cannot be explained as the result of supranational coercion or pressure: it was a voluntary process initiated by member states themselves.
In the literature on policy transfer, the dominant assumption is that voluntary transfer is a rational process, in which governments seek information about policy practices elsewhere to identify the most effective solution to their policy problem. It is acknowledged that actors' rationality is often 'bounded' but this is described as the result of incomplete information or external pressure (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; cf. Holzinger and Knill 2005) . In contrast, neoinstitutional approaches to policy transfer emphasise that transfer is not a rational problemsolving strategy, but 'the expression of a need of legitimation': transfer serves primarily to show that the chosen course of action is a 'entirely appropriate means to achieve a socially valued goal'. Particularly where a policy proposal is (likely to be) controversial, 'presenting a measure as a "solution that works" abroad is part of a strategy aimed at naturalising a political choice' (Delpeuch 2008: 10, 14) .
As we shall see below, the process of transfer of pre-departure integration requirements confirms the neo-institutionalist view, rather than the rationalist view. If the transfer had been part of a rational problem-solving strategy, then member states would have collected all information available to identify the most effective policy solution. Nothing indicates however that member states were interested in whether pre-departure integration requirements actually worked, that is in their effects. The information collected about other countries' policy practices was very limited, especially with regard to policy effects. For instance, no reference at all is made to policy evaluations -such as the 'Monitor Civic
Integration Exam Abroad' which was published by the Dutch government at least once a year since November 2007. One might argue that such 'rational policy-learning' is more likely to occur at the level of civil servants, than at the level of parliamentary debates analysed here.
However, if information about the effects of other countries' policy practices which supported the introduction of pre-departure integration requirements had been collected during the administrative preparation of policy proposals, there would be no reason for governments to refrain from sharing this information with Parliament. None of the governments presented such information. In fact, when a UK Liberal Democrat MP requested the Minister to 'ask the Netherlands Government whether they sought advice from independent agencies on the effects of their tests on integration', the government simply failed to respond (UK House of Lords 2010). This suggests that the aim of transfer was not rational problem-solving, but creating legitimacy for pre-departure integration requirements. In the UK as in the other member states, pre-departure integration requirements were justified not by showing that similar measures actually worked elsewhere, but only by arguing that they were also implemented elsewhere, as I will illustrate below. In essence, this boils down to the playground argument: 'it's alright, because the others are doing it too'. Politicians sought to build legitimacy for pre-departure integration measures not by proving their effectiveness, but by representing them as a shared practice among EU member states.
The Family Reunification Directive was also referred to as a source of legitimacy, but only to a very limited extent. The Dutch, French, and German governments referred to the Directive in the Explanatory Memoranda which accompanied their legislative proposals to introduce these requirements. However, the German and almost all the Dutch references were 'weak' legitimacy arguments, limited to stating -truthfully -that EU law allows but does not oblige member states to introduce integration measures for family migrants. The limited reference to the Directive as a source of legitimacy is less surprising when one takes into account that the scope which the Directive allows for integration measures has long been subject to debate among politicians and law scholars (cf. Groenendijk 2011) . From the first debates about pre-departure integration measures until today, the German and Dutch left-wing opposition have questioned the government about the compatibility of this measure with article 7.2 of the Directive (Dutch Lower House , 2008a German Lower House 2007 , 2009a , 2009b . In this report, Mariani examined the migrant integration policies of the US and Canada, i.e.
two 'old immigration countries', as well as of Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, selected 'because the integration policies they conduct are particularly interesting'. According to Mariani, his analysis showed that 'more and more countries tend to turn integration into a condition for admission, so as to start the integration effort as early as possible'. Mariani discussed Dutch pre-departure integration measures and German and Danish plans to introduce similar policies, and concluded that this 'testifies to a real European convergence on this point'. The first among the recommendations with which
Mariani concludes his report is for France to 'implement an integration test abroad for family migrants', following the Dutch, German and Danish example. This example confirms that 22 policy makers involved in policy transfer are not rational learners who collect as much information as possible to choose the best policy option (Holzinger and Knill 2005: 783) .
Rather, policy makers consider only a limited number of policy options implemented in other countries, selected according to a political rather than a scientific logic (Delpeuch 2008: 50) .
The five EU member states which Mariani selected are those with the most elaborate language and civic integration programs or requirements for migrants. Only on the basis of such a selective comparison could he have come to the conclusion that there is a 'real European convergence' around pre-departure integration measures, which after all had been adopted by no more than three out of 27 member states at the time. The selection of information collected for this report then was clearly based on political motives, i.e. on the wish to legitimate the proposal to introduce pre-departure integration measures.
Mariani's recommendation was taken over by Nicolas Sarkozy, Thus the government turned the argument around, presenting the Netherlands as 'acting as a pioneer for other countries to follow ' (Dutch Lower House 2008b: 4) . A couple of months after the Law on Civic Integration Abroad was adopted, the government added:
The Netherlands are taking the lead in Europe when it comes to civic integration abroad.
Many member states are following these developments with great interest. (…) I expect that other member states will follow our example after we have gained some experience with it and 24 that our system of civic integration abroad will serve as an example for other member states (Dutch Lower House 2005: 15) .
The Netherlands was the very first country in the Union to introduce integration requirements as a general condition for the admission of family migrants and it did not feel comfortable in this outlier position. Dutch politicians therefore actively engaged in turning integration abroad into a common practice among member states. Having other member states follow its lead gave Dutch civic integration policy the legitimacy of serving as a role model, rather than remaining an extreme and exceptional case. This is why the Dutch pushed for the inclusion of pre-departure integration measures among the actions eligible for financial support from the European Integration Fund. It is also why the French tried to encourage other member states to introduce language requirements for family migrants by including this policy measure in the European Pact on Migration and Asylum. To make sure that their policies fitted comfortably within the European norm -in the sense of common, accepted practice among member states -Dutch and French politicians endeavoured to modify this norm.
Conclusion
Over the last decade, six EU member states have introduced pre-departure integration requirements for family migrants. This policy instrument has proliferated through a voluntary mechanism of transfer with the European Union serving as a platform for the exchange of information and ideas among national policy-makers. Because of its voluntary nature, this transfer is similar to 'horizontal Europeanisation' but it differs from mechanisms such as the Open Method of Coordination in that the European Commission opposed rather than supported it. Member states were the only agents of transfer.
An analysis of political debates in five out of the six countries which introduced predeparture integration measures has shown that transfer is a process aimed not a rational 25 problem-solving, that is at identifying the policy solution that works best, but at creating legitimacy. Politicians seek to justify pre-departure integration measures not by showing that pre-departure measures have proven effective elsewhere, but merely by presenting such measures as a policy practice shared with other member states. Politicians in both the exporting and the importing countries refer to other countries conducting similar policies to legitimise pre-departure integration measures. The 'vertical' legitimacy of pre-departure integration measures, derived 'top-down' from formal EU legislation, appears problematic, as the compatibility of pre-departure integration measures with EU law is subject to increasing debate, with the Commission in particular adopting a critical stance. This is why member states adopt 'horizontal' legitimacy seeking strategies, where policy legitimacy is derived not from formal legal norms, but from policy practices shared with other countries.
The on-going process of Europeanisation of migrant integration policies is a multifaceted process, a 'struggle' as Carrera (2006: 13) puts it both about the approach to be adopted and about the repartition of competences. This analysis of the transfer of predeparture integration measures among EU member states draws attention to one of the dynamics -and perhaps the main dynamic -through which this Europeanisation is evolving.
What we have observed here is a process of policy transfer driven by (a select group of) member states against the express opposition of the Commission, where policy-making derives legitimacy not from formal European norms, but from shared policy practice. 
